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ABSTRACT
ON-CHIP COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY IN
FPGAS
SEPTEMBER 2018
SHIVUKUMAR BASANAGOUDA PATIL
B.E., SRI JAYACHAMARAJENDRA COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, MYSORE
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Russell Tessier
Innovations in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) manufacturing processes
and architectural design have led to the development of extremely large FPGAs.
There has also been a widespread adaptation of these large FPGAs in cloud infras-
tructures and data centers to accelerate search and machine learning applications.
Two important topics related to FPGAs are addressed in this work: on-chip commu-
nication and security. On-chip communication is quickly becoming a bottleneck in to-
day’s large multi-million gate FPGAs. Hard Networks-on-Chip (NoC), made of fixed
silicon, have been shown to provide low power, high speed, flexible on-chip commu-
nication. An iterative algorithm for routing pre-scheduled time-division-multiplexed
paths in a hybrid NoC FPGA architecture is demonstrated in this thesis work. The
routing algorithm is based on the well known Pathfinder algorithm, overcomes several
limitations of a previous greedy implementation and successfully routes connections
v
using a higher number of timeslots than greedy approaches. The new algorithm shows
an average bandwidth improvement of 11% for unicast traffic and multicast traffic
patterns.
Regarding on-chip FPGA security, a recent study on covert channel communica-
tion in Xilinx FPGA devices has shown information leaking from long interconnect
wires into immediate neighboring wires. This information leakage can be used by an
attacker in a multi-tenant FPGA cloud infrastructure to non-invasively steal secret in-
formation from an unsuspecting user design. It is demonstrated that the information
leakage is also present in Intel SRAM FPGAs. Information leakage in Cyclone-IV E
and Stratix-V FPGA devices is quantified and characterized with varying parameters,
and across different routing elements of the FPGAs.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis work is based on two loosely connected topics: on-chip communica-
tion and security. Chapter 2 describes a routing algorithm based on the Pathfinder
algorithm [20] to route time-division-multiplexed flits inside hybrid networks-on-chip
(NoC). Chapter 2 also provides an introduction to NoC routing, earlier background
work on NoC routing, and a hybrid NoC architecture. The chapter concludes with a
description of the experimental setup and the NoC routing algorithm’s results.
The major contributions of this work are as follows.
• The design of an iterative algorithm to route single source-destination time-
division-multiplexed (TDM) paths for a hybrid NoC architecture. We have
experimentally determined the Pathfinder algorithm’s cost parameters to max-
imize the bandwidth utilization across different traffic patterns (Chapter 2).
• The single source-destination routing algorithm was extended to route multi-
cast TDM traffic (Chapter 2).
• The algorithm was extended by analyzing the routing results of multiple traffic
patterns and comparing the improvements with a previous implementation’s
[18] routing results. The routing results are simulated using a cycle accurate
NoC simulator. Theoretical bandwidth and latency estimates derived from the
routing results are experimentally confirmed using the NoC simulator (Section
2.5).
1
.Chapter 3 describes a new security vulnerability in Intel FPGAs that allows an
attacker to non-invasively steal secret information from another user design in a multi-
tenant scenario in which multiple independent users have circuits on the same FPGA.
The chapter includes experimental methodology for characterizing information leak-
age in Intel FPGAs. Section 3.6 analyzes several characterization results by varying
FPGA parameters and operating conditions.
• It has been confirmed that there is information leakage from the long inter-
connect wires in the Intel SRAM FPGAs, namely Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V
FPGAs. We have verified the information leakage across multiple copies of the
FPGA boards. A CAD flow was devised to perform detailed manual routing
for Intel FPGAs. An experimental flow was designed to characterize the infor-
mation leakage using a ring oscillator (RO) counter along with measurement
circuitry. (Chapter 3).
• We analyzed the amount of information leakage for different types of horizon-
tal and vertical routing elements inside the FPGA, showed how the amount of
information leakage varies at different locations on the chip, for different num-
ber of routing elements, and the amount of overlap between transmitter and
receiver. (Section 3.6).
• We characterized the information leakage for static and dynamic transmitter
patterns of different Hamming weights and frequency (Section 3.6).
2
CHAPTER 2
NETWORK-ON-CHIP ROUTING IN FPGAS
2.1 Introduction
The need for both hard and soft FPGA NoCs has been well documented and a
number of NoC architectures have been developed. Packet-switched (PS) NoCs (sim-
ilar to those used on multi-core microprocessors) are well-suited to bursty traffic with
unpredictable destinations. Time division multiplexed (TDM) NoCs route stream-
based traffic using a schedule derived at compile time. In general, TDM NoCs exhibit
reduced latency and energy consumption versus packet-switched NoCs since router
buffering can be largely eliminated. This savings does come at the cost of some per-
router storage for the schedule memory. Recently, hybrid FPGA NoCs [13, 18] have
been introduced that support both PS and TDM routing. Since TDM routing is per-
formed at compile time and PS routing is performed at run time, care must be taken
during TDM routing to provide low latency and high throughput for stream-based
traffic without blocking additional PS traffic.
The selection of NoC channels and time slots for each TDM route requires an
extensive spatial and temporal search even if routes are constrained to shortest paths.
The lack of buffering for TDM routes requires time slots to be allocated sequentially.
Additionally, the use of routing resources should be balanced across the network to
allow for sufficient time slots for PS routing at run time. Previous work on TDM
routing algorithms for FPGA NoCs [13, 18] generally focuses on algorithm speed
rather than optimizing the amount of TDM bandwidth or balancing routing resources
by minimizing channel congestion. Given the amount of compile time needed for
3
Figure 2.1: 8x8 NoC Mesh Topology [18]
physical design of the FPGA logic, allocating a few seconds of additional compile
time to obtain higher-bandwidth TDM routes can be an effective goal.
Our new TDM routing approach for hybrid NoCs maximizes and balances TDM
bandwidth by using a multi-iteration one-step routing algorithm. For each routed
TDM flit, the algorithm performs a breadth-first search that simultaneously considers
both physical routing channels and time slots. A key aspect of the algorithm is its
use of a Pathfinder [20] approach to ripup and reroute. Wire and time-slot overuse
in a specific iteration is reflected in a non-decreasing cost value that can be used to
gently guide routes away from a resource during later iterations. Our TDM routing
algorithm is applied to a hybrid FPGA NoC for five widely-used NoC routing patterns.
4
Figure 2.2: IO ports of a NoC router. Each input port can be connected to one or
more output ports
2.1.1 NoC Architecture
The NoC routing experiments in this work are performed for the hybrid FPGA
NoC architecture shown in Figure 2.1 [18]. The NoC network is implemented as
hard silicon IP and is overlaid on the soft (programmable) FPGA fabric. The NoC
network has two dimensions (n = 2), the X-dimension and the Y-dimension; along
each dimension there are eight (k = 8) NoC routers. Thus, there are sixty four NoC
routers (size = kn = 82 = 64) in total, each router is referenced by a unique index
number. Each NoC router can communicate in full-duplex mode with up to four of
its adjacent routers. All routers in the NoC have the same number of timeslots (for
our experimentation, eight).
Figure 2.2 shows the IO ports of a NoC router. The router has four interconnect
ports along North, South, East, and West directions. The NoC router communicates
with its adjacent NoC routers using the interconnect ports. The NoC also has a
core port which interfaces the NoC router to the soft FPGA fabric. The core port
5
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Figure 2.3: Router for Hybrid FPGA NoC [18]
has an asynchronous FIFO buffer that performs data width conversion and data rate
conversion between the soft FPGA fabric and the NoC clock domains. Figure 2.3
shows the internal blocks of a typical hybrid NoC router [18]. The router contains
a context memory for TDM schedule information that can configure the crossbar to
connect a specific source port to each output port (e.g. S, N , ..). Output ports with
a – in the context memory on a specific cycle instead accept PS data. If a TDM
connection is allocated and no input data is available, PS data may be forwarded
instead. Each input module contains two sets of FIFOs that serve as PS buffers and a
bypass register for TDM data. Packet-switched routing is performed using dimension-
6
ordered routing (DOR). Since the TDM schedule length is short (eight time slots),
effective routing heuristics are needed to efficiently use available bandwidth.
2.2 Background
FPGA NoCs have several characteristics that differentiate them from multi-core
microprocessor NoCs. Since FPGA cores are expected to be simple, transmitted data
values are expected to arrive in order at the receiver. This issue generally results
in shortest-path routing for TDM communication and communication protocols with
predictable paths (e.g. DOR) for PS routing [2].
Most previous compile-time TDM approaches first identify the routing channels
used by paths and then select routing time slots. This two-step approach is easy
to implement but can lead to suboptimal results. For example, Lu and Jantsch [19]
use a depth-first search to select routing paths followed by scheduling. In Carle et
al. [4], TDM routes are limited to DOR to reduce route search complexity. A previous
hybrid FPGA router [13] can support simultaneous TDM and PS routing although all
traffic is limited to DOR patterns. Multiple TDM routing approaches have combined
channel with time slot selection. These algorithms greedily identify feasible solutions.
Kapre et al. [14] attempt to schedule routes using the first available time slot. Multi-
iteration ripup and reroute is mentioned but not implemented. Shpiner et al. [26]
use a single- iteration random-greedy scheduling algorithm to determine route time
slots. Evain and Diguet [6] use a space-time route allocation algorithm to minimize
the TDM schedule. In contrast, our approach combines path and time slot selection
in a single pass. TDM routes are not restricted to DOR; they can take any available
shortest path from source to destination. Although our TDM routing algorithm could
be applied to any FPGA NoC that supports TDM, it is optimized for hybrid NoCs
with both TDM and packet-switching.
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Liu et al. [18] described a one-step greedy shortest path algorithm for TDM rout-
ing. The algorithm selects intermediate nodes that have the least congestion along
the shortest path from source to destination. Once a routing resource is assigned to
a TDM net, it is permanently allocated to that TDM net and is not changed when
routing subsequent TDM nets. This activity leads to a net ordering issue where the
nets routed first will always have a higher priority claim on the routing resources. If
the initial routing path selection is not optimal, the overall routability of the design
will be affected. Figure 2.4 illustrates the limitations of the greedy shortest path
algorithm. Assume that the Path1 is routed before Path2. Since Path1 does not ex-
perience any congestion, it can select a routing path which conflicts with the routing
path of Path2. Our algorithm overcomes the net ordering issue using Pathfinder’s
iterative rip-up and reroute technique. After the first iteration, the conflicting path’s
nodes are assigned a higher cost. Hence, during the rip-up and reroute phase of the
algorithm the router will select a different, less congested routing path for Path1.
Path1
Path2
Conflict
Source 1 
Sink 1 Source 2 Sink 2 
(a)
Path1
Path2
Source 2 
Source 1 
Sink 2 Sink 1 
(b)
Figure 2.4: (a) Shortest Path algorithm [18] has resulted in conflicts. (b) Pathfinder
routing results after rip-up and rerouting.
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2.3 Routing Algorithm Implementation
Our multi-iteration routing algorithm [21] attempts to maximize TDM routing up
to the allocation requested by the user at compile time. Unused routing time slots can
be used for packet-switched routing. Our algorithm consists of three parts illustrated
in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. Each FPGA source component (e.g. soft processor, IP
core) communicates with one or more destination components forming a connection.
Each connection supports one or more periodic data transmissions (e.g. flits). To
provide comparisons to PS routing, four flits are considered a packet.
Data: List of multi-fanout connections (input to output)
Result: List of routing paths (S) for every connection
/* Try all starting time slots */
1 foreach i = 0 to num slots do
2 for j = i, j < num slots, j++ do
3 unrouted set = perform set route(unrouted set, j)
4 if no shared (channel, time slot) then
5 break
6 end
7 end
8 end
Algorithm 1: Traffic path algorithm [21]
Data: Set of unlocked connections, start slot j
Result: List of routing paths (S) with no (channel, slot) pair overlaps
Result: Set of connections with (channel, slot) pair overlap
1 Pathfinder ts(set, j)
2 Lock all connections with paths with no (channel, slot) pairs to overlap
3 set = set - locked connections
Algorithm 2: Route a set of unlocked connections perform set route
Algorithm 1 shows the top-level loop of data communication scheduling. An
attempt is made to schedule a route for each connection beginning at a starting time
slot at the source router. After paths consisting of (inter-router channel, timeslot)
assignments are made for each connection, a check for route success is performed. A
successful schedule includes no inter-router channel, time slot pairs that are shared
by multiple connections. If unsuccessful, paths for connections without overlap are
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locked and another set of routing attempts for the remaining unrouted connections
are performed beginning at the next starting time slot (e.g. starting time slot+1).
The process terminates when all connections have been successfully scheduled with no
overlap or no schedule can be found for them. In the latter case, unrouted connections
are routed at run-time using packet switching.
Data: List of connections (source, destination, and starting time slot)
Result: List of routing paths (S) for each connection of channel, time slot pairs
1 while shared (channel, slot) pair exists and iteration ≤ max iter do
2 for all connections i starting at time slot i.slot do
3 Rip up existing connection path Pi
4 Pi ← (source, i.slot)
5 Initialize expansion list = new MinHeap()
6 while all destinations dij not found do
7 Remove lowest cost node m with time slot j from expansion list
8 while fanouts n of node m at time slot
9 (j + 1) mod max slot on shortest path exist do
10 Add n to expansion list at cost cn + Ci
11 end
12 for all nodes n in path from dij to source do
13 Update cn
14 Add n to Pi
15 end
16 end
17 end
18 end
Algorithm 3: Pathfinder ts algorithm including time slots
Algorithm 2 illustrates the use of our Pathfinder ts algorithm that considers
both spatial (channels) and temporal (timeslots) information. One application of
Pathfinder ts is performed per starting time slot. Connections that are successfully
routed are locked.
Algorithm 3 forms the heart of our route scheduling approach. Each source-
destination connection i is built from a series of channel, time slot pairs along a
shortest path. Multi-fanout connections are supported and multiple iterations of rip-
up and reroute are performed. As a route proceeds from source to destination, the
cost of a new channel, time slot pair is considered. The lowest cost pair is selected at
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each step to create the lowest-cost scheduled path with cost Ci.
cn(ts) = (1 + congestionts × pfac)(1 + historyts × hfac) (2.1)
The Pathfinder cost function [3] in 2.1 determines the cost of using an adjacent node
(channel, time slot pair) in Algorithm 3. Congestion cost (congestionts) of a node is
the number of routing paths that are currently sharing it. History cost (historyts)
is a non-decreasing value which is increased by the amount of congestion cost at
the end of each iteration. Values pfac and hfac are congestion cost and history cost
multiplication factors, respectively. They are set to constant values of 1.6 and 0.2,
respectively, as determined via experimentation.
2.3.1 Multicast Routing
In multicast routing, a packet from a single source is transmitted to multiple
destinations. In PS multicast routing, a separate copy of the packet is sent from the
source to each destination. In TDM multicast routing, only a single copy of the TDM
flit is inserted from the core port of the driving source node. At all other non-terminal
sink nodes, the TDM flits are forwarded to multiple output ports to achieve multi-
casting; this makes multicast routing more efficient in TDM-routing. TDM multicast
routing can be treated as a multi-fanout net consisting of a single source node and
multiple destination nodes.
Algorithm 2 was modified to route multi-fanout connections. The multi-fanout
perform set route routine is shown in Algorithm 4. The algorithm decomposes the
multi-fanout connections into a list of single source-destination (unicast) connections
along with their corresponding starting time slots. The unicast connections are then
routed using the Pathfinder ts algorithm described in Algorithm 3. Figure 2.5 illus-
trates the process. A minimum spanning tree is constructed using all the nodes of a
multi-fanout connection. The source node made the root of the MST. Edge weights of
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Sink 1 (ts = 3)
Sink 2 (ts = 4)
distance (d = 3)
d = 1
d = 2
Source (time slot (ts) = 0)
Sink 3 (ts = 5)
(a)
Source (ts = 0)
d = 3
Sink 1 (ts = 3)
d = 2
Sink 3 (ts = 5)
Sink 1 (ts = 3)
d = 1
Sink 2 (ts = 4)
Sink 1 (ts = 3)
(b)
Figure 2.5: Routing a multi-fanout connection with one source node and three sink
nodes. (a) A MST is constructed from the multi-fanout connection nodes. The edge
weights correspond to Manhattan distance between the nodes. The starting timeslot
number at the source node is 0. Assuming a delay of one clock cycle per unit
Manhattan distance, the timeslot number at the sink nodes is calculated. (b) The
MST is decomposed into three single source-destination connections. These single
source-destination connections are routing using the Pathfinder ts algorithm (3)
the MST correspond to Manhattan distance between the nodes. The starting timeslot
at each sink node is calculated using the starting timeslot of the parent node and the
Manhattan distance between the nodes. A unicast connection is created for each edge
of the MST. After routing the unicast connections using the Pathfinder ts algorithm,
a multi-fanout connection is added to the locked set if all the edges of the MST are
routed with no overlap. The TDM flits are inserted once from the core port of the
source node (router). At the branching nodes, the TDM flit is simply forwarded
(copied) to multiple output ports.
2.4 Experimental Procedure
A comparison of our new bandwidth reservation algorithm over a previously-
published congestion avoidance shortest-path algorithm [18] was performed using the
following traffic patterns: Bit-Reverse (source = x, destination = bit-reversed(x)),
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Data: Set of unlocked multi-fanout connections, start slot j
Result: List of routing paths (S) with no (channel, slot) pair overlaps
Result: Set of connections with (channel, slot) pair overlap
1 foreach multi fanout connection in unlocked connection set do
2 Create a minimum spanning tree (MST) of the multi fanout connection
3 Add each edge of the MST along a unicast connection to set.
4 end
5 Pathfinder ts(set, j)
6 Lock all connections whose MST edges are routed with no (channel, slot) pairs to
overlap
7 set = set - locked connections
Algorithm 4: Route a set of unlocked multi-fanout connections perform set route
Tornado (source = (x, y), destination = (x+ k
2
−1 mod k, y+ k
2
−1 mod k)), Trans-
pose (source = (x, y), destination = (y, x)), 2-Side (source-destination on parallel
terminal edges of the NoC), and 4-Side (source-destination along the perimeter of the
NoC). An open-source cycle accurate NoC simulator, called BookSim [11], was used
to simulate the NoC, measure latency, and verify the theoretical bandwidth estimates.
BookSim was updated to include the algorithms described in the previous section.
Earlier work [18] was leveraged to generate TDM and PS traffic for simulation. For
every traffic pattern, detailed routing was performed using the bandwidth reservation
algorithm. Simulations were performed using PS-only, TDM-only, and hybrid (PS &
TDM) routing. A 64 node, 8 × 8, 2D mesh NoC model was used for simulation. PS
flits were routed using X-Y (dimension-order) routing. Each packet is 512 bits in size,
and divided into four 128-bit flits. There are eight timeslots available for each router,
giving each context memory eight entries. Table 2.1 lists all the NoC parameters of
our experiments.
2.5 Results and Analysis
2.5.1 NoC Routing Results
Table 2.2 lists the routing results of the Pathfinder based traffic pattern algorithm
(Algorithm 1) and shortest path algorithm [18] for the five different traffic patterns.
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Topology 64-node, 8 x 8, 2D Node
Technology 45nm at 1.1V, 1.0 GHz
Routing X-Y Routing
Channel width 128 bits
Packet size 4-flits
Context memory 8 entries
Virtual Channels 2/port
Buffer size per VC 10 flit depth
Table 2.1: Network simulation parameters of Hybrid NoC
Traffic pattern Shortest Path Pathfinder
Routed/Total Min Max Mean σ Routed/Total Min Max Mean σ
Bit-Reverse 272/512 1 8 4.25 1.82 281/512 3 8 4.39 1.62
Tornado 141/512 1 5 2.20 0.75 161/512 2 3 2.51 0.53
Transpose 288/512 2 8 4.50 1.88 288/512 3 8 4.50 1.73
2-Side 91/128 5 7 5.68 0.68 127/128 7 8 7.93 0.24
4-Side 104/128 5 8 6.50 0.86 128/128 8 8 8.00 0.00
Table 2.2: TDM routing results of Shortest Path and Pathfinder algorithms for dif-
ferent single-source, single-destination traffic patterns.
For each traffic pattern, several routing results are reported. The Bit-Reverse, Tor-
nado, and Transpose traffic patterns have 64 connections, therefore there are 512 (64
× 8 time slots) possible TDM connections. In contrast, 2-Side and 4-Side are low
congestion traffic patterns with 16 connections, i.e. 128 (16 × 8 timeslots) TDM con-
nections. The first column of the each algorithm’s result shows the number of TDM
connections successfully routed out of the maximum available TDM connections for
each one of the traffic patterns. The Min and Max columns indicate the minimum
and the maximum number of timeslots routed for any connection in a traffic pattern.
The Mean and σ columns show the average and standard deviation of the number of
timeslots routed for all the connections in a traffic pattern.
From Table 2.2, it is clear that the Pathfinder ts based routing algorithm routes a
higher number of timeslots than the greedy shortest path algorithm [18] for all traffic
patterns. A higher number of timeslots directly translates to higher bandwidth as
shown in Table 2.3. On average, our Pathfinder based algorithm achieves 11 % higher
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Traffic pattern Shortest Path (%) Pathfinder (%)
Bit-Reverse 53.12 54.88
Tornado 27.53 31.44
Transpose 56.25 56.25
2-Side 71.09 99.21
4-Side 81.25 100.0
Average 57.84 68.35
Table 2.3: Fraction (in %) of total bandwidth routed by shortest path and Pathfinder
algorithms.
bandwidth compared to the shortest path algorithm [18] for single-destination traffic
patterns. Also, in the Pathfinder’s results, a higher Min and lower standard deviation
means a better distribution of the available timeslots among the different connections
of the traffic pattern.
For Bit-Reverse and Tornado traffic patterns, the shortest path algorithm is lim-
ited by the net ordering issue, and for some connections, the shortest path algorithm
is able to route only a single timeslot. The effects of the net ordering issue on the
routing results are more pronounced in the low congestion 2-Side and 4-Side traffic
pattern results. Both 2-Side and 4-Side traffic patterns are fully routable designs,
which means that there is a feasible path from every source node to its sink node.
From the bandwidth results shown in Table 2.3, the Pathfinder algorithm achieves
about 29% higher bandwidth for the 2-Side traffic pattern, and about 20% higher
bandwidth for the 4-Side traffic pattern. These results indicate the advantages of the
one-step rip up and reroute approach in the Pathfinder algorithm.
The latency of the Transpose, Tornado, and Bit-Reverse traffic patterns for the
hybrid NoC model were generated using the BookSim software. The average network
latency results of PS routing, and TDM routing using the shortest path algorithm
and Pathfinder algorithms are plotted in Figure 2.6. As evident by the bandwidth
results in Table 2.3, the Pathfinder algorithm has the lowest latency at higher packet
insertion rates for all traffic patterns when compared to the shortest path algorithm.
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Figure 2.6: Average packet latency for transpose, tornado and bit-reverse traffic
pattern using only TDM or PS routing. Note: SP (Shortest Path), PF (Pathfinder).
As there are more scheduled TDM timeslots in the Pathfinder’s routing, the TDM
flits wait for a shorter time for the next available timeslot in the core port.
Interestingly, at lower packet insertion rates, PS routing performs better than
Pathfinder algorithm because the PS flits routing don’t have to wait at the core port
for a scheduled timeslot. As the packet insertion rate increases, the PS routing quickly
gets limited by DOR, and the latency increases sharply at higher packet insertion
rates. For the Bit-Reverse and Tornado traffic patterns, although the shortest path
algorithm’s average number of timeslots routed per connection is very close to the
Pathfinder’s value (Table 2.2), it still performs poorly at higher packet insertion
rates. This is due to the fact that for some of the connections the minimum number
of timeslots routed is just one in the shortest path algorithm (Table 2.2). Therefore,
these bandwidth starved connections get saturated at relatively lower packet insertion
rates and sharply increase the average latency of the entire network. PS routing
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Figure 2.7: Average NoC latency for different amounts of TDM traffic for transpose
under fixed total packet injection rate of 0.05 packets/node/cycle. Note that PS
traffic decreases as TDM traffic increases.
routing performs better than Pathfinder routing for the Tornado traffic pattern since
Tornado is well suited for DOR, and PS flits do not need to wait for the scheduled
timeslots in the core port.
Figure 2.7 shows latency results for the Transpose traffic consisting of both TDM
and PS packets. The total injection rate is fixed at 0.05 packets/node/cycle, and the
TDM injection rate is increased gradually. Initially, as PS traffic is high, it has higher
latency. As the TDM injection rate is increased, the PS traffic reduces, and subse-
quently, PS latency decreases. As indicated in Table 2.2, the Pathfinder algorithm has
a lower standard deviation compared to the shortest path algorithm, indicating better
distribution of timeslots throughout the network. Hence, the Pathfinder algorithm
results in lower latency for both PS and TDM traffic.
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Traffic pattern Shortest Path Pathfinder
Routed/Total Bandwidth(%) Mean σ Routed/Total Bandwidth (%) Mean σ
4-Destination Multicast 84/128 65.62 5.25 1.14 99/128 77.34 6.18 0.91
Table 2.4: Multicast routing results of the shortest path and Pathfinder algorithms.
There are 16 four-destination multicast connections in the traffic pattern
2.5.2 Multi-cast Routing Results
Table 2.4 compares the multicast routing results using the Pathfinder and shortest
path algorithms. The multi-cast traffic pattern [18] consists of 16 four-destination
multicast connections. The four destination nodes are chosen such that they are
separated from the source by a minimum distance of three nodes. Similar to the
unicast routing results, the Pathfinder algorithm overcomes the net ordering issue
and shows about 12% improvement in overall bandwidth.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a heuristic routing algorithm that is tuned for routing traffic in
hybrid FPGA NoCs is presented. This multi-iteration router balances routed traffic
across routing resources to reduce congestion. Multiple rip-up and reroute iterations
are used to enhance low-latency, time-scheduled communication. Substantial data
stream bandwidth and latency improvement for a collection of five benchmarks is
shown using our new routing approach.
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CHAPTER 3
CHARACTERIZATION OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE
IN INTEL FPGAS
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the use of FPGAs in
cloud based infrastructure to accelerate machine learning and big data applications.
Amazon EC2 F1 [1] and Microsoft Project Catapult [5] projects have deployed Xilinx
Ultrascale and Altera Stratix-V FPGAs, respectively in their server infrastructures.
Although these platforms support a single user at this time, a multi-tenant use sce-
nario seems inevitable in the near future. A recent study [8, 9] on several Xilinx
devices has discovered that a long interconnect wire induces a different amount of
delay on its adjacent wires depending on whether it is transmitting logic ‘1’ or logic
‘0’. This information can be used by attackers in a multi-tenant scenario to non-
invasively snoop information from a user design. Figure 3.1 illustrates what happens
when an attacker and a user design share adjacent interconnect wires in a routing
channel. As shown in [8], the attacker can snoop information from the user design by
measuring the delay change in the long wires attached to the attacker’s circuits.
This raises serious security concerns in a multi-tenant scenario where a single
FPGA will be shared by multiple untrustworthy users. The existing work is extended
by first proving that the information leakage is indeed present in multiple Intel FPGA
device families. Following this, the delay change is measured and characterized at dif-
ferent FPGA parameters and operating conditions. Experiments are repeated several
times on multiple boards to validate the correctness of the results. Based on the
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Figure 3.1: A multi-tenant FPGA attack scenario [8]. A single FPGA is shared by
multiple users and an attacker can snoop information from another user by routing
his interconnect wires close to the user’s wires.
characterization results, vulnerabilities and limitations of information leakage are re-
ported. These results can be used to formulate attacks and countermeasures.
3.2 Side Channel Information Leakage in FPGAs
FPGAs, like ASICs, leak information in the form of temperature, electromagnetic
emanations, and power in side channels. If an attacker has physical access to the
FPGA, he can snoop this information leakage from the side channels to steal secret
information from the user design. Even though side channel information leakage
has been studied by Ji et al. [27], Daniel et al. [30], and Iakymchuk et al. [10] for
establishing covert channel communication, these findings focus on physical design
manipulation. In an FPGA cloud based environment, most of these side channel
attacks can be eliminated by restricting physical access to the side channels of the
FPGAs. However, Schellenberg et al. [7] and Zhao et al. [29] have demonstrated the
possibility of remote power side channel attacks inside FPGAs using on-chip sensors.
Krieg et al. [16] showed a technique to leak information from FPGAs by deliber-
ately inserting malicious hardware Trojans in the device during the manufacturing
process. Kelly et al. [15] and Lecomte et al. [17] showed that the hardware Trojans
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can be detected using on-chip monitoring techniques by analyzing the electrical ac-
tivities of the device. Hardware Trojans can be less effective in FPGAs than ASICs
as the design functionality is not known during the manufacturing process.
In a recent study, Giechaskiel et al. [8] discovered that a long interconnect wire
induces different amounts of delay into its adjacent wires when it is carrying a logic
‘1’ or a logic ‘0’. This delay change, although small, can be measured using a ring
oscillator (RO) and a counter circuit. The period of the ring oscillator adjacent to
a transmitter decreases when the transmitter is sending logic ‘1’ compared to when
the transmitter is sending logic ’0’. As shown in Figure 3.2, the logic ‘1’ and logic
‘0’ values of the transmitter can be directly inferred from the ring oscillator’s count
value. The authors proved that the information leakage is present in multiple Xilinx
FPGA device families and at different locations on the chip. The authors performed
a comprehensive characterization of the amount of information leakage with different
varying parameters for Xilinx FPGA devices.
Although interesting, the authors leave several questions unanswered, the root
cause of information leakage is not analyzed, and the authors do not attempt to
characterize the information leakage in Intel SRAM FPGAs. Since the routing ar-
chitecture of Intel FPGAs is different from Xilinx FPGAs, the information leakage
characterization of Intel FPGAs is crucial to identify security vulnerabilities. The au-
thors’ work is extended by first proving that information leakage is indeed present in
Intel FPGAs. The problem is approached from an attacker’s perspective, using only
the information available in the public domain. A CAD tool flow is established to per-
form detailed manual routing for Intel FPGAs. The adjacency information between
the interconnect wires is experimentally determined. Following this, a comprehensive
characterization of the amount of information leakage in Cyclone-IV E and Stratix-V
Intel FPGA devices is performed. From the characterization results, vulnerabilities
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Figure 3.2: Ring oscillator count when an adjacent transmitter is carrying logic ‘1’
or logic ‘0’ in a Xilinx Virtex-5 XUPV5-LX110T (ML509) FPGA [8].
and limitations are identified. The characterization results can be further used to
reduce the likelihood of an attack.
3.3 Approach for Characterizing Information Leakage
It is important to understand the routing architecture of Intel SRAM FPGAs
to characterize the information leakage. The next sub-section briefly describes the
generic routing architecture of Intel SRAM FPGAs (e.g. Stratix-V and Cyclone-IV
families) . Following this, a CAD tool flow and an experimental setup is presented
for characterizing the information leakage.
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Figure 3.3: Routing architecture of Intel Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs [23, 24].
3.3.1 Routing Architecture of Intel SRAM FPGAs
A generic routing architecture of a typical Intel SRAM FPGA, such as the Cyclone-
IV, is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The global routing resources inside the Intel SRAM
FPGAs consist of Row (horizontal) and Column (vertical) routing elements. The
Row and Column routing channels interconnect the logic elements (LEs) from one
logic array block (LAB) to another LAB. The column routing channel consists of C4,
C8, C14, and C16 individual routing elements which can span up to 4, 8, 14, and 16
vertical LABs respectively. Similarly, the row routing channel has R3, R4, R6, and
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Figure 3.4: Intel FPGA CAD tool flow used for characterization experiments.
R24 routing elements which span 3, 4, 6, and 24 horizontal LABs respectively. The
presence of a routing resource and the number of routing resources is device depen-
dent. For example, Cyclone-IV E FPGAs have 96 C4 and 16 C16 routing elements in
the column routing channel. The relatively short routing elements (C4, R3/R4/R6)
are the most abundant routing resources in Stratix-V and Cyclone-IV FPGA devices.
The R3/R4/R6 and C4 routing elements can be directly driven by logic elements,
while the longer R24 and C16/C14 routing elements can be only driven by R4/C4
routing elements.
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3.3.2 CAD Flow
The information leakage experiments require precise placement and routing of
the attacker’s (receiver) circuit and the victim’s circuit (transmitter). Quartus Prime
Standard Edition 17.1 software is used for characterizing Stratix-V (5SGXEA7K2F40C2)
and Cyclone-IV E (EP4CE115F29C7) FPGA devices. The Quartus Prime software
includes all the tools required to synthesize, place and route, generate a bit-stream,
and test the FPGA designs. The CAD tool flow for characterization experiments
is shown in Figure 3.4. The measurement design along with the attacker’s and the
victim’s circuits are specified in the System Verilog RTL (Register-Transfer Level)
hardware description language. The RTL is synthesized using the Quartus Map
(quartus map) tool. The Placement and Routing tool, Quartus Fit (quartus fit),
is guided by placement constraints in the Quartus Settings File (QSF) and the rout-
ing constraints in the Routing Constraints File (RCF) to achieve the desired manual
placement and routing of the attacker and the victim’s circuits.
To guarantee that the Quartus Fit tool has honored the routing constraints, the
routing results are back-annotated using the Quartus Database Tool (quartus cdb),
and manually compared against the user specified routing constraints. If the routing
constraints match then the FPGA bit-stream is generated using the Quartus Assem-
bler tool (quartus asm).
3.3.3 Decoding the Routing Graph of Intel SRAM FPGAs
To perform precise routing as mentioned in the previous section, the attacker
should have detailed device level information about the underlying routing archi-
tecture of the FPGA. The Quartus Prime tool includes an advanced device TCL
package which provides detailed information about the availability of different types
of routing resources in a FPGA device. However, it does not provide information
about fan-in and fan-out connections of the routing elements. By finding out the le-
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Figure 3.5: Tool flow to determine legal fan-in and fan-out connections of routing
elements.
gal fan-in and fan-out of the routing elements, the attacker can reconstruct the entire
routing graph of the FPGA device.
Typically, for security reasons, the FPGA vendors do not make the routing archi-
tecture public. However, it is still possible for an attacker to uncover the underlying
routing architecture by performing a set of routing experiments and then reverse en-
gineering auto routing results. Figure 3.5 illustrates this process. A post-synthesized
netlist consisting of a single source logic cell (LCELL) connected to a single desti-
nation LCELL is used for the experimentation. The LCELLs are manually placed
using the placement constraints specified in the Quartus Settings File (QSF) of the
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project. To find out the legal fan-outs from the source LCELL, all the routing el-
ements in the nearby locations of source LCELL are iteratively searched. For each
routing element near the source LCELL, the fan-out connection from the LCELL to
the routing element is specified in the routing constraint file (RCF). Following this,
constrained routing is performed using the Quartus Fit tool. If there is a legal route
between the LCELL and the routing element, the Quartus Fit tool will honor the
routing constraints, otherwise they are ignored. The legal routing constraints which
are accepted by the Quartus Fit tool are added to a database. Since there are a finite
number of routing elements near the LCELLs of a LAB, all the legal connections can
be determined in a short amount of time. Consistent with the highly regular structure
of the FPGAs, it has been discovered that the decoded connection information of the
LAB is valid across many LABs at different locations on the chip.
3.3.4 Determining Adjacent Interconnect Wires
To perform characterization experiments, the attacker’s long wire or wires should
be adjacent to the victim’s long wire. Since this information is not publicly available,
it is derived experimentally. Figure 3.6 illustrates the process.
One of the long wires in the channel is connected to the ring oscillator, which
serves as the attacker (receiver), and all the remaining wires are victim (transmitter)
wires which can transmit either a logic zero or one. A one-hot test pattern is driven
through the transmitters in which a single transmitter is driving logic one, and all
the remaining transmitters are tied to logic zero. If a transmitter adjacent to the ring
oscillator’s long wire is driven to logic one, it will cause a noticeable change in the ring
oscillator’s frequency. In all other scenarios there will not be any significant changes
in the ring oscillator’s frequency. This experiment can be repeated by changing the
position of the ring oscillator to determine the adjacency information of all the routing
elements in the channel.
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Figure 3.6: Approach for determining transmitter wires that are adjacent to a
receiver.
3.4 Experimental Setup
Figure 3.7 shows the block diagram of the test setup used to characterize the
information leakage from the long interconnect wires. The transmitter is implemented
using one or more long interconnect wires. The test pattern generator (Figure 3.7)
consists of a 32-bit circular serial shift register. When the test pattern generator is ON
(enabled), it serially shifts logic values from the 32-bit register into the transmitter.
By programming different values into the 32-bit test pattern generator’s register,
different types of static or dynamic test patterns can be sent through the transmitter.
The test pattern generator assigns a logic ‘0’ to transmitter when it is OFF (disabled).
Similar to [8], the receiver is implemented as a three-stage ring oscillator (RO) with
one inverter and two buffers. One of the wires of the RO is adjacent to the long wires
of the transmitter.
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Figure 3.7: Experimental setup for information leakage characterization [25].
A binary counter measures the RO’s frequency by incrementing a 32-bit count
value at every positive edge of the ring oscillator clock for a fixed time duration
(measurement period). After the measurement period, the count values are sampled
and stored into an on-chip SRAM memory. A SignalTap II JTAG interface is used to
read the stored count values. The design has a JTAG-accessible configuration memory
and an FSM which coordinate test pattern generation, counting, and sampling of
counter values. Unless otherwise noted, all circuitry, except the transmitter and
receiver, are auto-placed and routed by Quartus Prime v17.1.
3.5 Experimental Parameters
The information leakage was measured for two different Intel FPGA family boards,
Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V. For the Cyclone-IV FPGA device experiments, the DE2-
115 FPGA board shown in Figure 3.8 was chosen. The board features a Cyclone-IV
E FPGA device with part number EP4CE115F29C7. The device is manufactured in
65-nm process. For the Stratix-V experiments, an Altera Stratix-V GX development
kit consisting of Stratix-V GX FPGA with the part number 5SGXEA7K2F40C2 was
chosen (see Figure 3.9). Stratix-V FPGAs are manufactured in 28-nm process. All
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Figure 3.8: A DE2-115 board contains a Cyclone-IV E EP4CE115F29C7 FPGA [28].
the experiments were performed on two copies of the DE2-115 and Stratix-V FPGA
boards. Except for heat chamber experiments, all the other experiments are per-
formed at room temperature without any external temperature regulating equipment.
Information leakage was tested at nine different locations on the FPGA.
The ring oscillator’s frequency change was measured using the experimental setup
[25] described in Section 3.4. The measurement period is set to 21ms, and 1024 sam-
ples were collected for each experiment. Each experiment was repeated five times
for consistency. Unless otherwise stated, in all experiments the transmitter and the
receiver consists of a single long routing element. The ring oscillator’s frequency
changes with time due to changes in temperature, voltage, and other operating pa-
rameters. Therefore, the relative change in the ring oscillator’s count (∆RC) metric
described by Giechaskiel et al. [8] is used for is measuring the information leakage as
shown in the following equation.
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Figure 3.9: A Stratix-V GX development kit board contains a 5SGXEA7K2F40C2
FPGA [22].
∆RC =
CON − COFF
CON
(3.1)
CON is ring oscillator’s count when the test pattern generator is enabled (ON ), and
the transmitter is carrying the serial value shifted out by the 32-bit test pattern
register. COFF is the ring oscillator’s count when the test pattern generator is disabled
(OFF ), and the transmitter is carrying logic ‘0’. The transmitter alternates between
the ON phase and the OFF phase for every 21ms measurement duration. Unless
otherwise mentioned, the transmitter carries logic ‘1’ during ON phase, and logic ‘0’
during the OFF phase.
3.6 Results and Analysis
The experimental results are briefly summarized below. A detailed discussion of
each experiment is provided in the following subsections.
• Location Independence: The information leakage was characterized at nine
different locations for the Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs. It has been proved
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Figure 3.10: Information leakage was verified at different locations on Stratix-V and
Cyclone-IV FPGAs. (T=Top, M=Middle, B=Bottom, L=Left, R=Right)
that the information leakage is present at all nine locations across multiple
routing elements in Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs. The information leakage
is strong in the shorter C4 routing elements.
• Transmitter/Receiver Length: The information leakage increases linearly
with the length of transmitter/receiver in C4 routing elements in Cyclone-IV
and Stratix-V FPGAs. The information leakage is weak in longer C14/C16
routing elements.
• Transmitter Duty Cycle: The information leakage increases linearly with
the duty cycle of the transmitter.
• Transmitter Frequency: In the majority of the experiments, the information
leakage decreases with the transmitter frequency. However, at some transmitter
frequencies the ring oscillator shows phase locking behavior with the transmit-
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ter. When the ring oscillator is locked with the transmitter, the ring oscillator’s
count value remains almost constant between different trials.
• Measurement Duration: The information leakage value (∆RC) is more noisy
at short measurement durations because the ring oscillator counter has less time
to capture the changes in the ring oscillator’s frequency.
• Multiple Transmitters: The information leakage is strong when a transmitter
is immediately adjacent to the receiver. The information leakage is negligible
at higher adjacency levels.
• Impact of Temperature: As the operating temperature is increased, the ring
oscillator’s frequency decreases because the electron mobility decreases with
temperature. In Cyclone-IV FPGAs it has been observed that the ring oscilla-
tor’s count value becomes more stable with an increase in operating tempera-
ture.
3.6.1 Location Independence
To test if the information leakage is present at all locations on the chip, information
leakage is measured at nine distinct chip locations, as illustrated in Figure 3.10. The
measurement circuit described in Section 3.4 along with a single transmitter and a
single receiver is used for the experiment. The transmitter and receiver are each
implemented using a single global routing element. They are manually placed and
routed, and a separate bit-stream file is generated for each location. For each FPGA
device, several types of routing elements are characterized. The transmitter sends a
static logic ‘1’ for 21ms, and then transmits logic ‘0’ for the next 21ms.
Figure 3.11 shows the average ∆RC value on two identical Cyclone-IV FPGA
boards. The routing elements C4, R4, and C16 are characterized. These results
confirm that the information leakage is present at almost all locations on the chip.
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Figure 3.11: Relative count difference of the ring oscillator due to values of the
adjacent transmitter (see Eq. 3.1). For this experiment, both the transmitter and
the receiver include a single global routing element. Across various locations and
FPGAs, driving a 1 onto the transmitter causes a receiver speed-up of the order of
0.01% (1 part per 10,000).
Leakage is higher in the shorter C4 and R4 routing elements, which constitute the
majority of the global routing resources in the FPGA device. Although there are
some variations in the ∆RC value at different locations on the chip, the ∆RC values
at a given location are nearly identical across Board 0 and Board 1. Therefore,
the variation in ∆RC at different locations can be attributed to the changes in the
FPGA silicon layout, and not to manufacturing or silicon variations in general. Figure
3.12 shows information leakage at different locations on the Stratix-V FPGA device.
Four different routing elements are characterized, C4, C14, R3, and R6. The results
are similar to the one observed in the Cyclone-IV device. This confirms that the
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Figure 3.12: Repeating the experiment from Figure 3.11 on Stratix-V devices on
two identical boards produces comparable results.
information leakage phenomenon is present in multiple Intel FPGA device families.
The average ∆RC value in Stratix-V FPGA device is almost half the value observed
in the Cyclone-IV FPGA device. The C4 routing element has the highest ∆RC value
compared to other routing elements. The ∆RC values at a given location are identical
in Board 0 and Board 1. Although the relative count difference value is small, (less
than 0.01%), it is still measurable. This small change in the ring oscillator frequency
is sufficient to perform side channel attacks similar to differential power analysis as
demonstrated by Ramesh et al. [25]. The information leakage may be due to small
changes in the ring oscillator’s driver’s voltage when the transmitter is carrying logic
‘1’.
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Figure 3.13: Relative count differences increase with different transmitter/receiver
lengths (in terms of number of LABs). The experiment uses a transmitter/receiver
pair at the bottom left of the Cyclone-IV EP4CE115F29 FPGA.
3.6.2 Length of Transmitter/Receiver
In this experiment the effect of transmitter and receiver length on the relative
count difference is analyzed. The transmitter’s and receiver’s lengths are increased
by stacking multiple routing elements on top of each other. Apart from the transmit-
ter/receiver length, the experimental setup is same as in the location independence
experiment. The transmitter and receiver are placed in the bottom left location on
the chip. In the Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs, the column routing elements can
be vertically stacked on top of each other, i.e. a routing element can be connected to
another routing element of the same index at the endpoint. For example, the rout-
ing element C4:X5Y4Z0I0 can be connected to C4:X5Y8Z0I0 in a Cyclone-IV device.
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Figure 3.14: Impact of transmitter/receiver length on relative count difference in a
Stratix-V 5SGXEA7K2F40C2 FPGA. The relative count differences in the
Stratix-V FPGA are much lower compared to the Cyclone-IV FPGA (Figure 3.13).
For the C14 routing element, ∆RC remains relatively flat.
The routing element C4:X5Y4Z0I0 with index I0 spans vertically from Y=4 till Y=8,
at Y=8, it can be connected to another routing element (C4:X5Y4Z0I0) with index
I0. However, the horizontal routing elements are rotated as they move through the
switch box, therefore, they cannot be stacked on top of each other. Therefore, in this
experiment, only the column routing elements, C4, C14, and C16 are considered.
Figure 3.13 shows the average relative count difference for a Cyclone-IV FPGA.
For the C4 routing elements, the average ∆RC value increases linearly with the
transmitter/receiver length. However, for C16 routing elements, the rate of increase
is much slower. Figure 3.14 shows the relative count change with the transmit-
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Test pattern (32-bit) Hamming Weight Duty Cycle (%) Frequency (MHz)
0x0000000F 4 12.5 3.125
0x000000FF 8 25.0 3.125
0x00000FFF 12 37.5 3.125
0x0000FFFF 16 50.0 3.125
0x000FFFFF 20 62.5 3.125
0x00FFFFFF 24 75.0 3.125
0x0FFFFFFF 28 87.5 3.125
0xFFFFFFFF 32 100.0 3.125
Table 3.1: Dynamic transmitter test patterns with the same frequency and increasing
Hamming weights. The system clock is 100MHz.
ter/receiver length in the Stratix-V FPGA device. There is a small increase in rela-
tive count difference with the transmitter/receiver length for the C4 routing elements.
However, for the C14 routing elements, the transmitter/receiver length doesn’t have
a significant impact on the relative count difference. The number of long routing ele-
ments (C14/C16) in the column routing channel is much less compared to the shorter
C4 routing elements. It is possible that the longer routing elements are sparsely placed
with a higher degree of spacing or isolation to reduce delay and coupling, which might
explain the weaker information leakage in long interconnect wires.
3.6.3 Transmitter Duty Cycle
In this experiment, the impact of transmitter duty cycle (on time) on the informa-
tion leakage is analyzed. The test pattern generator has a 32-bit register which can
be programmed to transmit different test pattern signals through the transmitter.
The test pattern generator circuit serializes the 32-bit pattern register by shifting one
bit out on each clock cycle starting from the least significant bit into the transmitter
wire. Table 3.1 lists different test patterns along with their Hamming weight, duty
cycle, and frequency. The frequency of all test patterns is set to 3.125 MHz. Apart
from the test pattern generation, all other experimental parameters are the same as
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Figure 3.15: Impact of transmitter duty cycle on information leakage in a
Cyclone-IV FPGA. The average ∆RC value increases with an increase in the duty
cycle of transmitter.
the ones used in the location independence test (Section 3.6.1). The transmitter and
the receiver are placed in the bottom left location on the chip.
Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 show the impact of transmitter duty cycle on the rela-
tive count difference in Cyclone-IV FPGA and Stratix-V FPGA devices, respectively.
As the duty cycle of the transmitter is increased, the time duration of the transmitter
carrying logic ‘1’ is increased. This increases the ring oscillator’s frequency count
value (CON). Therefore, the average ∆RC value increases with the duty cycle. This
observation is true for all routing elements across both FPGA boards. It can be
observed that the C4 routing element has higher ∆RC compared to all other routing
elements in the Stratix-V FPGA.
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Figure 3.16: Repeating the experiment described in Figure 3.15 for a Stratix-V
FPGA device. Similar to the Cyclone-IV, the ∆RC value increases with the duty
cycle of the transmitter.
3.6.4 Transmitter Frequency
One of the main claims in the Xilinx characterization results [8] is that the relative
count difference is only dependent on the duty cycle of the transmitter signal, and
not on the switching rate of the transmitter. This claim is tested in Intel FPGAs by
programming the test pattern generator register with values listed in Table 3.2. The
test patterns have different frequency but fixed Hamming weight and duty cycle. The
experimental setup is similar to the one used in the transmitter duty cycle experiment
(Section 3.6.3).
Figure 3.17 shows the relative counter difference in the Cyclone-IV FPGAs. From
the plots, it is clear that the ring oscillator’s frequency is affected by the transmitter
signal’s frequency. In general, the ∆RC value decreases with an increase in transmit-
ter frequency in the Cyclone-IV FPGA.
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Test pattern (32-bit) Hamming Weight Duty Cycle (%) Frequency (MHz)
0xFFFF0000 16 50.0 3.125
0xFF00FF00 16 50.0 6.250
0xF0F0F0F0 16 50.0 12.500
0xC0C0C0C0 16 50.0 25.000
0xAAAAAAAA 16 50.0 50.000
Table 3.2: ∆RC for dynamic transmitter test patterns with the same Hamming weight
and increasing frequencies. The system clock is 100MHz.
Figure 3.18 shows the variation of ∆RC in Stratix-V FPGA devices. From the
location independence experiments it is clear that information leakage is weak in R3,
C14, and R6 routing elements. Therefore, the R3, C14, and the R6 routing elements
are less sensitive to frequency changes in the transmitter. Since the information
leakage is strong in the C4 routing element, the ∆RC value changes sharply with
the transmitter’s frequency. The variation in the ∆RC value for C4 appears to be
random.
3.6.5 Measurement Duration
Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show the relative count difference for increasing measure-
ment periods in Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs, respectively. The experimental
setup is the same as the one used in the location independence experiment. The
transmitter and the receiver are placed in the bottom left location of the FPGA chip.
For smaller measurement periods, the relative count difference is noisy, as the ring
counter lacks sufficient cycles to count the frequency change. For higher measurement
periods, the ∆RC value is more stable.
3.6.6 Multiple Transmitters
Table 3.3 compares the ∆RC value when the transmitters are placed at different
adjacency levels from the receivers in the Cyclone-IV FPGA. The experimental setup
is similar to the one used in location independence experiment. The transmitter and
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Figure 3.17: Impact of transmitter frequency on the relative count difference (∆RC)
in a Cyclone-IV FPGA. The ∆RC value decreases with an increase in transmitter
frequency.
the receiver are placed in the bottom left location. The transmitters on either side of
the receiver induce almost identical delay changes in the receiver. If both the left and
the right transmitters are active, an additive effect is incurred on the delay change
of the receiver. When a transmitter is at one or more adjacency level away from the
receiver, there is no noticeable change in the ∆RC value.
3.6.7 Impact of Temperature on the Ring Oscillator’s Frequency
The ring oscillator’s frequency variations with temperature are characterized us-
ing the experimental setup shown in Figure 3.21. Test boards containing an Intel
FPGA were placed inside a TestEquity 115A heating chamber. The ring oscillator’s
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Figure 3.18: Relative count difference for different transmitter frequencies in
Stratix-V FPGAs. The ∆RC value changes with the transmitter frequency. The
∆RC for C4 routing elements is inconsistent across boards. The relative change
almost remains flat for other types of routing elements (C14, R3, and R6).
frequency was measured at temperatures from 25◦C to 65◦C. The experimental setup
for characterization is the same as the one described in the location independence
section 3.6.1. The FPGA boards were preheated for 10 minutes before running each
experiment. This allowed the FPGA boards to be in thermal equilibrium with the
heating chamber.
Figures 3.22 and 3.23 show the relative count difference change with temperature
in Cyclone-IV and Stratix-V FPGAs. Since the ∆RC is a normalized value, it shows
no correlation with respect to temperature changes in either FPGA device. Figures
3.24 and 3.25 show the ring oscillator’s absolute count value at increasing temperature
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Figure 3.19: Relative frequency count with respect to measurement period in a
Cyclone-IV FPGA device.
values when the transmitter is always carrying a logic ‘0’. In both FPGA devices,
there is a small decrease in the ring oscillator’s count with temperature. This is
expected behavior since electron mobility decreases with temperature, thus increasing
the delay of the ring oscillator.
It has been discovered that the ring oscillator’s count value becomes less noisy at
higher temperatures in Cyclone-IV FPGAs. Figure 3.26 shows the ring oscillator’s
count when the transmitter is sending logic ‘1’ and logic ‘0’ at 25◦C and 65◦C. It
can be observed that at 65◦C the ring oscillator’s count value is more stable. To
confirm this phenomenon, the standard deviation of the ∆RC value was plotted
at increasing temperatures when the transmitter is carrying logic ‘0’. Figures 3.27
and 3.28 show the standard deviation of ∆RC with temperature. In the Cyclone-
IV FPGA devices, standard deviation decreases linearly with temperature. This
phenomenon can be theorized as follows. The FPGA die temperature is high due to
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Figure 3.20: Average ∆RC value at increasing measurement periods in a Stratix-V
device. The ∆RC value is more stable at higher measurement periods as the
counter has sufficient time period to capture the ring oscillator’s frequency change.
internal power dissipation. At lower operating temperatures, there is a large difference
between the FPGA die temperature and the heating chamber temperature. These
temperature fluctuations might cause the random changes in the ring oscillator’s
frequency at lower temperatures. As the heating chamber temperature is increased,
the temperature gap between the FPGA die and the chamber decreases, this reduces
the temperature fluctuations in the FPGA die, and thereby, reducing the variations
in the ring oscillator’s frequency. However, in Stratix-V FPGA devices, the standard
deviation remains almost flat with respect to temperature in all types of routing
elements. It can be theorized that in Stratix-V FPGAs, the FPGA die always remains
at higher temperatures due to large internal power dissipation, and the temperature
inside the die is less affected by the heating chamber temperature.
At some transmitter frequencies, the ring oscillator shows a type of locking be-
havior with the transmitter. Figure 3.29 shows the locking behavior for 12.5 MHz
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Configuration ∆RC (1e-4)
0.965
1.002
2.000
-0.041
–
Table 3.3: Relative count results for different transmitter configurations in the
Cyclone-IV FPGA. The transmitters and receivers have a length of two C4 wires.
The final row is the baseline configuration against which the ∆RC values of the other
configurations are evaluated.
Intel FPGA 
(Cyclone IV E/ 
Stratix-V)
USB to JTAG
FPGA  Board
PC 
(quartus_stp)
Power Supply
Heating Chamber 
(TestEquity 115A)
USBJTAG
Figure 3.21: Experimental setup for characterizing information leakage at different
operating temperatures.
transmitter frequency in Stratix-V FPGA board 1. The transmitter/receiver consist
of four C4 routing elements located in the bottom left location on the FPGA chip.
The experiment was conducted at 25◦C temperature. From Figure 3.29, it can be
observed that the ring oscillator’s count values are locked around 2,887,500 when the
transmitter is sending a toggling signal of 12.5 MHz. In contrast, the ring oscillator’s
count values are noisy when the transmitter is sending logic ‘0’. The ring oscillator’s
count value 2,887,500 corresponds to exactly 11 (2887500 / 21ms measurement dura-
tion / 12.5 MHz TX frequency) times the transmitter frequency. This means that the
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Figure 3.22: The average ∆RC shows no correlation with temperature in a
Cyclone-IV FPGA.
ring oscillator (RO) oscillates exactly 11 times for each oscillation of the transmitter
(TX) wire. To check if locking happens at other ring oscillator count values, the ring
oscillator’s frequency (count) is changed by increasing the temperature from 25◦C to
65◦C. The ring oscillator’s count values at increasing temperatures are shown in Fig-
ure 3.30. The locking ring oscillator’s count values are marked on the y-axis. The ring
oscillator’s frequency (count) decreases with temperature. However, the transmitter
(TX) stays at 12.5 MHz as it is regulated by the clock.
Initially, at 25◦C, the ring oscillator’s count is locked around 2,887,500. As the
temperature is increased, the ring oscillator loses the lock around 30◦C temperature.
The ring oscillator regains the lock for a short duration at six other ring oscillator
count values (Figure 3.30). Figure 3.31 is a magnified version of Figure 3.30 showing
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Figure 3.23: There is no change in the average ∆RC with temperature in a
Stratix-V FPGA.
the ring oscillator locking around a 2,782,500 count value. In this case, the ring
oscillator has exactly 53 oscillations in the time that the transmitter has 5 oscillations.
Table 3.4 lists all the ring oscillator’s count values at which the locking behavior was
observed along with the temperature span duration for which the ring oscillator was
locked. From Table 3.4, it can be observed that the locking behavior is strong when
the transmitter’s frequency is an integer multiple (11) of the ring oscillator’s frequency.
The locking behavior is also observed at non-integer multiples of the transmitter’s
frequency. In these cases the ring oscillator and the transmitters are periodic to each
other. The locking behavior might be due to coupling between the transmitter and
the receiver.
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Figure 3.24: The ring oscillator’s count decreases with temperature in a Cyclone-IV
FPGA. The electron mobility decreases at higher temperatures, thereby reducing
the ring oscillator’s frequency.
3.7 Limitations
The information leakage observed in this study is only present between the imme-
diately adjacent interconnect wires. If an attacker does not have access to the target
user design, it would very be difficult to locate the transmitter’s interconnect wires
in the FPGA device. The information leakage is quite noisy, and the ring oscillator’s
frequency changes with temperature, voltage, and other operating parameters. It
is difficult to statically predict the logic level of the transmitter using the absolute
ring oscillator count value. A successful attack [25] requires sophisticated statistical
analysis on large number of measurements. It has been shown that the ∆RC values
become less predictable with increased transmitter frequency. Therefore, it might be
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Figure 3.25: The experiment illustrated in Figure 3.24 repeated for Stratix-V
FPGAs. There is a small decrease in the ring oscillator’s frequency with
temperature.
difficult to attack user designs operating at higher frequencies, although work at the
University of Massachusetts is continuing in this area.
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Figure 3.26: Ring oscillator count in the Cyclone-IV FPGA at 25◦C and 65◦C when
the transmitter is sending logic ‘1’ and logic ‘0’. The ring oscillator’s count is more
stable at 65◦C.
RO count
in 21ms
RO
frequency
(MHz)
Ratio of RO
frequency to TX
frequency (12.5 MHz)
Temperature span
over which RO
remains locked (◦C)
2,887,500 137.5000 11/1 4.20
2,822,000 134.3810 ≈ 43/4 0.20
2,812,500 133.9286 75/7 0.18
2,800,000 133.3333 32/3 0.18
2,782,500 132.5000 53/5 0.58
2,756,250 131.2500 21/2 0.15
2,737,500 130.3571 73/7 0.18
Table 3.4: Ratio of ring oscillator frequency to transmitter frequency at different ring
oscillator count values.
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Figure 3.27: The standard deviation of the ∆RC decreases with temperature in two
Cyclone-IV FPGA devices.
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Figure 3.28: The standard deviation in ∆RC is unaffected by temperature changes
in two Stratix-V FPGA devices.
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Figure 3.29: Ring oscillator locking at 12.5 MHz in a Stratix-V FPGA. The
transmitter/receiver are four C4 routing elements long. The ring oscillator’s count
values are not noisy when the transmitter is carrying a 12.5 MHz frequency signal.
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Figure 3.30: The ring oscillator’s frequency is changed by increasing the operating
temperature from 25◦C to 65◦C. The ring oscillator shows locking behavior at seven
different ring oscillator count values.
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Figure 3.31: Figure 3.30 zoomed in around the 2,782,500 RO count value. The ring
oscillator’s count is highly stable when the transmitter is sending a 12.5 MHz signal.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This thesis work addressed two important challenges in modern FPGAs: on-chip
communication and security. For the on-chip communication topic, a new iterative
routing algorithm based on the Pathfinder algorithm is developed to route TDM
flits in a hybrid FPGA NoC architecture. The proposed routing algorithm showed
an 11% improvement in bandwidth for unicast and multicast traffic patterns. As
FPGAs continue to increase in size and complexity, providing high speed, low power,
scalable interconnect will be a challenge. FPGA NoCs are expected to be one of the
major architectural enhancements in next generation FPGA devices. The design of
efficient NoC routing algorithms is crucial to extract the best possible performance
from FPGA NoCs. Since most industrial FPGA CAD tools already use the Pathfinder
algorithm, our routing algorithm can be easily integrated into existing CAD tools.
Future work could consider optimizing the routing for multi-fanout connections by
using Steiner Trees [12].
On the security aspect, a new vulnerability is identified in Intel Stratix-V and
Cyclone-IV FPGAs. It has been confirmed that there is information leakage from
long interconnect wires in these devices. It has been discovered that information
leakage occurs at almost all locations on the FPGA chip, and across several types
of routing elements. The impact of transmitter length, switching rate, and duty
cycle on the information leakage has been characterized. It has been shown that
information leakage is dominant in the nearest adjacent routing elements. The effect
of temperature on the ring oscillator’s frequency and the information leakage has
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also been characterized. Recently, the use of FPGAs in cloud infrastructures has
gained significant attention. With increased interest in big data, machine learning,
and multimedia applications, one can only expect this trend to grow in the future.
Although current FPGA cloud infrastructures do not support multi-tenancy, there
are strong incentives for providing multi-tenancy in the near future. A multi-tenant
FPGA cloud infrastructure could dramatically reduce the cost of FPGAs for clients
by efficiently sharing FPGA resources between multiple users. Therefore, it is crucial
to identify and isolate security threats before deploying FPGA multi-tenancy in cloud
infrastructures.
A successful attack has already been demonstrated [25] on an AES core using our
characterization results. Future work could consider identifying attacks on other types
of applications. New countermeasures should be developed to isolate user designs from
these security threats. The countermeasures could be architectural changes or silicon
layout improvements in new FPGAs. For existing FPGA devices, new CAD flows
could be explored that mitigate the likelihood of an attack.
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